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Abstract
We examine how ownership structure affects managerial incentive alignment mechanisms
and strategic objectives. We compare large Indian firms with dispersed equity ownership with
business-group affiliates operating within the same institutional frameworks. We find that
the performance sensitivity of CEO pay and turnover differ significantly across group affiliates
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Business groups with concentrated ownership structures, often via a founding family are a com-
mon organizational form in emerging economies. Although debate over the relative costs and
benefits of group affiliation is long standing, variations in managerial incentives and business
strategy have received little empirical attention. In this paper we examine managerial incentive
alignment mechanisms in firms with different ownership structures, and we examine how such
incentives are associated with firm strategy and performance.
A popular view is that concentrated shareholding of the founding family is associated with
weaker corporate governance (La Porta et al., 1999; Gibson, 2003). Holderness (2009) notes
that most U.S. firms have large blockholders who may have conflicts of interest with managers
and small shareholders. Moreover, dual class shares in the U.S. and the pyramid structure of
cross-holdings in East Asian countries can lead to wide variations between control and cash flow
rights (Masulis, et al., 2009, Classens et al., 2002), as well as expropriation of minority share-
holders. Bertrand et al. (2002) find evidence of expropriation through tunneling of resources.
Expropriation can lower the performance of group affiliates versus that of widely held firms
(Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). If institutional and minority
investors rationally expect these costs, it will reflect in the stock prices of the group affiliates
(Masulis et al., 2011).
There are many reasons for forming a business group. First, concentrated shareholding and
family control offer the benefits of intergenerational ownership stakes and strong reputational
concerns. This ”Stewardship” role can improve firm performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003;
Maury, 2006). Business group affiliates can also leverage investments, production, and infor-
mation through common ownership, while generating financing advantages through intra-firm
loans (Gopalan et al., 2007). Khanna and Yafeh (2007) find that business groups are more com-
mon in markets with less developed institutions and are often formed with government support.
Family-controlled business groups can reduce transaction costs with outsiders in an environment
of inadequate laws but they can continue to exist when legal protection is adequate.
We examine the differences among incentive structures, strategic priorities and competitive-
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ness between business group affiliates and stand-alone firms. Firms with different ownership
structures naturally face different agency and transaction costs. Thus, we expect managerial in-
centive alignment mechanisms to differ as well. To that end, we use data from large listed Indian
firms to compare incentives across business group affiliates and stand-alone firms. Specifically,
we focus on differences in the performance sensitivities of CEO pay and CEO turnover between
group affiliates and stand-alone firms with dispersed shareholding.
Our results suggest that CEO pay is higher in business group affiliates, but pay-performance
sensitivity is also higher. On the other hand, CEO turnover is more sensitive to performance
in widely-held firms than to that in business group affiliates. We distinguish further within a
business group between firms with CEOs from the controlling family, and firms with outside
CEOs. We find that firms with outside CEOs in group affiliates tend to offer managerial in-
centive structures that are similar to that of the CEOs in unaffiliated firms. Collectively, our
results suggest that firms with different ownership structures tend to feature different kinds
of incentive alignment mechanisms: performance-sensitive CEO pay (carrot-type incentives)
and performance-sensitive CEO turnovers (stick-type incentives).1 In business group affiliates
with a family-CEO and intergenerational stakeholding, we find that carrot-type incentives are
commonly used, while CEOs of widely held stand-alone firms are more likely to be at risk for
dismissal over poor performance. However, we also find that, when business group affiliates
have outside CEOs, the incentive alignment structure is similar to that in stand-alone dispersed
shareholding firms. These types of incentives are not mutually exclusive but under incomplete
managerial contracting, one of the two types tend to dominate.
Next, we investigate how managerial incentive design is associated with the strategic choices
of business group firms and widely-held firms. There is some evidence that managerial incen-
tives affect firm strategy (Ederer and Manso, 2016; Manso, 2011; Croci and Petmezas, 2015;
Low, 2009). Siegel and Choudhury (2012) argue that affiliate firms of business groups pursue
different strategies than unaffiliated firms, which we must consider when examining expropria-
tion mechanisms in business groups. We compare group affiliates and unaffiliated firms on long-
1Our definition of a stick-type incentive is based on the likelihood of CEO dismissal for poor performance.
This is different from Dittman, Maug and Spalt (2010) formulation of minimum wage CEO pay as a stick type
incentive within a loss-aversion framework.
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and short-term strategic objectives. Stand-alone widely held firms tend to emphasize short-term
strategic goals such as the current ratio and the asset-turnover ratio; business group affiliates
tend to focus more on long-term investments in research and development (R&D) and capital
expenditures. We interpret these results to mean that faced with stick-type incentives, managers
of stand-alone firms will prioritize shorter-term targets. The controlling shareholders of business
group affiliates, because they enjoy longer-term control over their firms, generally invest more
in longer-term strategies.
Finally, we examine the implications of the differences in incentive alignment and strategic
objectives for firm performance. We find that performance does not seem to vary systematically
with ownership structure. Notwithstanding the differences in managerial incentives and strategic
priorities, firm performance appears similar for Indian business group affiliates and for widely
held stand-alone firms.
We use data from Indian firms for several distinct considerations. First, India provides a
unique setting from which to compare firms with different ownership structures within the same
institutional and legal framework. Anglo-American type dispersed ownership firms, and con-
centrated shareholding insider-dominated business groups such as East-Asian firms are both
common in India. Among the top 500 Indian firms, which constitute 99% of market capitaliza-
tion, 32.67% are affiliates of diversified business groups, 17.63% are controlled by the state, and
49.7% are Anglo-American–style stand-alone firms with dispersed shareholding. Second, India
has a mature capital market, so the financial information and industry classifications are largely
consistent and comparable (Jameson et al., 2014). Recent regulations in India have aimed to
make governance frameworks and reporting standards consistent with those in the U.S. and the
EU.
The economic liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991 relaxed investment and trade
barriers and increased competition in most industries. The proportion of widely-held firms
increased during the post-liberalization period. In this environment, the concurrent increase in
competition would drive out less efficient ownership structures, but both business group affiliates
and dispersed ownership firms have continued to coexist successfully for over two decades. In
contrast, in Japan and South Korea, keiretsus and chaebols, respectively, have long been the
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dominant organizational forms, and the institutional framework has evolved to support them.
The presence of both business group affiliates with concentrated shareholding and widely held
stand-alone firms within the same regulatory and accounting framework allows us to overcome
many of the shortcomings of cross-country comparisons of corporate governance (Kaplan, 1994,
1997).
Our paper contributes to several strands of the corporate finance literature. First, we con-
tribute to the literature on managerial incentives by comparing incentive design in business
group affiliates and stand-alone firms. While there is some evidence of the incentives in business
group firms, we provide direct comparative evidence on managerial incentives in group affiliates
and stand-alone firms. For example, Gibson (2003) shows, for firms with concentrated owner-
ship, that CEO turnover is not sensitive to performance and Croci et al. (2012) report lower
CEO pay in European family firms than in unaffiliated firms. In contrast, our results provide
evidence of the relative dominance of pay-performance (carrot-type) and turnover-performance
(stick-type) incentives across group affiliates and stand-alone firms. Moreover, we show that
the incentives of outside CEOs in group affiliates resemble those of CEOs in stand-alone firms.
These results contribute to the literature by providing clear evidence of differences in managerial
incentives in firms with different ownership structures.
Second, our results contribute to the literature on how managerial incentives may be cor-
related with firm strategy. Empirical evidence on the strategic choices of firms with different
ownership structures is scant. Croci and Petmezas (2015), Low (2009), and Armstrong and Va-
sistha (2012) show that CEO compensation design affects risk-taking incentives and firm value.
In contrast, we show that the planning horizons of managers vary with incentive structure. For
example, managers in group affiliates with carrot-type incentives make long-term investments,
while managers in stand-alone firms with stick-type incentives emphasize shorter-term strate-
gic measures. This is consistent with Ederer and Manso’s (2016) experimental evidence, which
shows that the threat of CEO turnover decreases, while entrenchment increases the incentives
for longer-term strategies such as innovation.
In this paper, we follow the approach of Siegel and Choudhury (2012) who argue that differ-
ences in strategic choice need to be considered when examining whether business groups serve
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as a mechanism for financial redistribution, or expropriation. While they examine how business
group affiliates react to industry shocks, we examine the interrelationships among ownership
structure, managerial incentives, and strategic priorities.
Finally, there has been little consensus thus far on how ownership structure is related to firm
performance. Jameson et al. (2014) study the impact of having family members on boards. They
find that the involvement of controlling shareholders in governance adversely affects firm per-
formance. On the other hand, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that the structure of corporate
ownership varies in ways that are consistent with value maximization. Our focus here is primar-
ily on the effect of group affiliation and ownership structure on firm performance. Our results
suggest there are no systematic performance differences between group affiliates and stand-alone
firms. This confirms the view that agency costs arising out of the separation of ownership and
control act to counterbalance the transaction costs of enforcing incomplete contracts.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background on
Indian corporate governance structures and our empirical motivation. Section 3 describes our
data, while section 4 discusses the econometric methods and our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Motivation
2.1 Institutional background
The institutional framework for corporate governance in India dates back to 1875 with the es-
tablishment of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The Companies Act of 1956, which governed
the activities of listed firms in India, was subsequently replaced by the Companies Act of 2013.
Since the liberalization of the economy in 1991, the role of government has reduced, with a
shift away from the traditional interventionism and toward a more Anglo-American style of
governance. Indian firms have thus become increasingly reliant on external sources of finance.
La Porta et al. (1999) classify India as having a high shareholder rights index, on par with the
U.K., the U.S., Canada, Hong Kong, and other English-origin common law countries. Given the
power of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the primary regulatory authority,
India scores highly on measures of investor protection, the procedural clarity of its judiciary,
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and its level of disclosure requirement. However, these are undermined by long delays in the
completion of court cases. India falls in the bottom 25% on indices for the enforcement of rule
of law and corruption.
In an attempt to improve the corporate governance scenario, SEBI enacted Clause 49 of
the Listing Agreement for all firms listed in the BSE 200 index from 2001 onward. Similar to
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S., Clause 49 mandates clear governance standards for
listed firms. These range from board composition and independence of the audit committee, to
enhanced disclosure norms, and stronger requirements for corporate directors and officers to be
responsible for financial statements and the monitoring of internal control systems. Such reforms
brought India closer into line with developed capital markets, and have likely contributed to the
increase in investments by foreign institutions.
In contrast to the mixed response to Sarbanes-Oxley in the U.S., Clause 49 had a significantly
positive impact on stock returns (Khanna, and Yafeh, 2007; Chakrabarti et al., 2007). Note
that Indian accounting standards are, largely aligned with International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS), which makes verifying the reliability of information much easier. By 2005,
all Indian listed firms had adopted the regulations of Clause 49, thereby enhancing transparency
and comparability of the data.
Dispersed shareholding patterns in India are less common than in the U.S. or U.K. More
than 17% of firms listed on the BSE are wholly or significantly controlled by the federal or
state government, and three of the top six Indian firms in 2014 were public sector firms. The
proportion of large stand-alone firms in India with a dispersed shareholding pattern only began
to increase over the past twenty years. Currently, about half of the top 500 firms listed on the
BSE feature western-style diversified shareholding where a professional manager has relatively
little stake in the firm.
Diversified business groups, with family-centric controlling stakes are a major organizational
form in the Indian corporate sector. A common characteristic is the presence and influence of
“promoters”; i.e. controlling stakeholders who can be an individual or a family.2 Promoters, on
2SEBI defines a promoter as ”the person or persons who are in control of the company, directly or indirectly,
whether as share holder, director or otherwise; or person or persons named as promoters in any document of offer
of securities to the public or existing shareholders or in the shareholding pattern, disclosed by the company under
the provisions of the Listing Agreement”.
7
average hold about 42% of shares in business-group firms3.
Although Indian business groups share some characteristics of an interconnected business
relationship structures with a Japanese keiretsu, several key differences set them apart. On
the one hand both structures feature individual firms that are legally separate entities, that
are primarily responsible to their own shareholders, and are audited separately. On the other
hand, unlike a keiretsu, in which the affiliate firms are connected and coordinated through a
common group-specific bank, the affiliate firms within an Indian business group are coordinated
by interlocked boards and by members of the promoter family. In that respect their ownership
structure resemble those of Korean chaebols (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). A typical Indian
business group has dozens of firms with complex cross-holdings, which makes it difficult to
compute the conventional measures of cash flow rights and voting rights.
The prevalence of business group firms in emerging markets such as India, raises questions
about the sources of competitiveness of group affiliation. First, business groups may dominate
industries of strategic importance. Such industries in India, like railways, national defense,
and coal, for example, are nationalized and thus an unlikely source of competitive advantage.
However, in emerging markets with weaker institutions, group affiliates may benefit from within-
group internal capital markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). They can also support financially
weaker affiliates by means of intra-group loans and cash-transfers. An important reason for
doing this is to avoid the negative spillover from default by an affiliate to the rest of the group
(Gopalan et al., 2007)
Further, the strategic objectives of business group affiliates and stand-alone firms can be
different. For example, during times of positive industry-wide demand shocks, group affiliates
tend to increase operational expenses, while stand-alone firms tend to increase sales volume
(Siegel and Choudhury, 2012). There may also be distinct differences in board composition,
institutional shareholding, and the design of managerial incentives. In this paper, we explore
those differences in incentive design, firm strategy and performance.
3Firms with dispersed shareholding structures may also have CEOs and board-members who are members of
the founding family. However, their control over the firm is limited compared to business group affiliate firms
with more concentrated shareholding and cross-holding structures.
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2.2 Managerial incentive alignment mechanisms
The evidence on how ownership structure impacts managerial incentives is limited mainly to
cross-country comparisons. For example, Kaplan (1997) finds that U.S. market-based gover-
nance is no more effective at replacing poor performing CEOs than the relationship-oriented
governance styles of Germany and Japan. Gibson (2003) finds that CEO turnover is not sen-
sitive to performance in emerging economy firms with a concentrated shareholding. Empirical
evidence suggests that institutional and legal frameworks are significantly correlated with owner-
ship, performance, and governance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; La Porta et al., 1997). Therefore,
the evidence based on a pooled sample of multiple countries cannot adequately control for the
role of institutional and legal frameworks. Such variations in regulatory frameworks, data collec-
tion and methodology are among the major challenges to cross-country comparisons of corporate
governance practices and outcomes (Bryson et al., 2014).
Single-country studies on how ownership structure affects managerial incentives have typi-
cally focussed on the differences between large and small firms (Black, et al., 2006) or between
foreign and domestic holdings (Patibandla, 2006). Results indicate that larger firms, and firms
with higher foreign institutional holdings are better governed. Some studies explore the gover-
nance in concentrated holding firms such as those within keiretsus or chaebols. These papers
examine the effects of firm performance and CEO turnover (Berglof and Perotti, 1994; Kang
and Shivdasani, 1995) and find that non-routine CEO turnover is negatively correlated with
firm performance.
More recently, some evidence on the governance structure of Chinese firms observed that
certain facets of western corporate governance are present in Chinese and East Asian firms
(Conyon and He, 2011; Bryson et al., 2014). For example, managerial power played a prominent
role in pay setting.
However, there is no direct evidence concerning the design of managerial incentive structure
in group affiliates versus stand-alone firms. A priori, managerial incentives for a family-CEO
with an intergenerational stake in a firm are likely to differ significantly from those of a profes-
sionally recruited risk-averse CEO with myopic loss aversion (Dittman et al., 2010).
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2.3 Incentive design and strategic objectives
Low (2009) finds that compensation design impacts manager’s risk taking behavior. The effect
can be multi-dimensional. Manso (2011), and Ederer and Manso (2016) argue that the threat of
termination (stick-type incentives) can undermine managerial incentives for long-term strategies,
such as innovation. They find that such strategies are better facilitated by longer-term rewards
and managerial entrenchment.
As Siegel and Choudhury (2012) suggest, the correlation between managerial incentives and
corporate strategy is important because firm strategies play an important role in the empirical
investigation of governance and performance. They find differences between how Indian business
group firms and stand-alone firms react to positive industry shocks. If managerial incentives
between both groups differ, and incentive structures are tied to the planning horizon of strategy,
we can expect strategic priorities of both types of firms to differ as well.
2.4 Business group affiliation and firm performance
Empirical evidence on corporate governance in emerging economies is focused mainly on the
performance of group affiliates, relative to unaffiliated firms. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) show
that ownership structure and firm performance vary in ways that are optimal for firm value,
i.e. firm performance does not depend on ownership structure. However, tunneling of assets by
the controlling stakeholders at the expense of minority shareholders in business groups remains
a concern (Johnson et al., 2000; Bertrand et al., 2002). This problem can lead to inefficiency
and competitive disadvantages. Bertrand et al. (2002) find that business group affiliates are
30% more likely to suffer earnings losses during industry shocks than western-style stand-alone
firms in the same industry. However, firms at the lower tier of the pyramid are affected less
by shocks because they are buffered somewhat by the assets of the firms at the top of the
pyramid. Bertrand et al. (2002) suggest that the controlling stakeholders therefore benefit at
the expense of minority shareholders. Also, Jameson et al. (2014) show that the performance of
business group affiliates declines with board memberships of controlling shareholders. Neither
higher institutional ownership nor greater board independence is found to mitigate this negative
association.
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On the other hand, Khanna and Palepu (2000) find that affiliates of diversified Indian busi-
ness groups can create internal processes to deal with institutional voids, and therefore perform
better than stand-alone firms. Using data from forty-five countries, Masulis et al. (2011) show
that group affiliation reduces financing constraints, which leads to greater investment intensity.
Siegel and Choudhury (2012) show that group affiliates adjust their cost structure differently
with respect to stand-alone firms when faced with a macro-level shock. Controlling for differences
in business strategies, they find no evidence of tunnelling in Indian business groups.
A question thus arises: How do the different strategic priorities of business group affiliates
affect firm performance? There does not appear to be any consensus thus far, particularly taking
into account possible differences in incentive alignment mechanisms and strategic objectives
between group affiliates and stand-alone firms.
3 Data
3.1 Sample selection
India has a mature capital market, so financial information and industry classifications are
largely consistent and comparable. Our data come from the Prowess database, maintained by
the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, and we purposefully chose 2006-2013 for our
sample because by 2005, Clause 49 had been implemented uniformly across all listed Indian
firms. As Siegel and Choudhury (2012) note, the survivorship bias in the early Prowess data
had also been corrected by 2005, and in 2013, a new Companies Act had largely superseded the
Act of 1956, most notably with respect to incorporation and director responsibilities.
For each year, we take the top 500 listed firms on the Bombay Stock Exchange which represent
over 95% of total market capitalization. We follow each firms from the time it first enters BSE
500 within our sample period until the end of the sample period, even if it does not remain on
the BSE 500. We exclude firms that go private, are acquired, or are delisted due to any other
reasons. We also exclude public sector firms with significant government ownership and political
appointments because they usually lend themselves poorly to comparisons. We find that public
sector firms in India are disproportionately in strategically important industries such as defense,
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railways, and some forms of energy. The managerial incentives also differ significantly in public
sector firms.4 Similarly, we exclude foreign-owned firms, as well as firm-year observations with
missing data on ownership, and firm performance measures. We obtain information on the
education and experience of individual directors and CEOs from BoardEx, and merge it with
Prowess.5
Our final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 577 firms with 4,143 firm-year obser-
vations. The measurement and classification of firms’ shareholding structures lie at the heart
of our empirical strategy. We classify firms into two categories, Business Group Affiliates and
Stand-Alone Firms, based on the two parameters of information from Prowess. First, we identify
affiliate firms of business groups. Like many Asian countries, group firms in India are connected
through equity ownership. In most cases, the controlling shareholder is a family, such as the
Tata, Birla, Bajaj, or Ambani family, for example. Classifying firms as an affiliate of a business
group is an inexact science. A firm is not entirely defined by either a certain percentage of equity
ownership with a particular individual or family nor by the appointment of a family member as
the CEO or Chairman. We use data available from Prowess and public filings to determine a
company’s association with a business group. We then create a binary indicator, Business Group
Affiliates, which equals 1 for business group firms and 0 otherwise. While the binary classifica-
tion is a relatively crude measure, it is consistent with those used in the literature on emerging
market finance (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Bertrand et al., 2002; Siegel and Choudhury, 2012).
Second, we identify shareholders who control a firm either directly through their own share-
holding or indirectly through cross-holdings. In all our regressions we control for %Shareholding−
Promoters by combining direct shareholding of promoters with the proportion of shares held
by persons acting in concert with promoters. This provides a measure of direct and indirect
control of a firm by the promoters within business group firms.
Of the 577 firms in our sample, we classify 226 (39.16%) as affiliate firms of business groups,
and 351 (60.83%) as stand-alone firms with dispersed shareholding. The affiliate firms of busi-
ness groups are often connected through common family ownership and cross-holding between
4For example, CEOs or Managing Directors of public sector firms are fixed term bureaucratic appointments
and the pay is contingent on tenure and rank.
5We use fuzzy-matching algorithms on firm names to merge BoardEx and Prowess, which gives us an 83%
match or near-match. We also conduct a second-level of manual matching to complete the exercise.
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different group firms. They are also more likely to have a member of the promoter family as the
CEO. Note that we make an important distinction here: Not all business group affiliated firms
appoint CEOs from the controlling family. About 44% have outside CEOs. In our empirical
analyses, we will investigate differences in incentive-alignment between business group affiliates
with outside CEOs and those with family CEOs.
To further explore incentive alignment mechanisms, we define the top executive of a firm as
the CEO, where “managing director” and “chief executive officer” are used interchangeably in
the official job title. Prowess identifies the top executive of each firm provides but provides no
information on whether the CEO is a founding family member. We therefore hand-collect that
information from various firm filings (annual reports, statutory filings with the stock exchange,
etc.).
CEO Pay in India is structured as fixed salary plus performance-based pay. This structure
is similar across firms with both types of share-holding patterns. The performance-based com-
ponent or variable pay, unlike the equity-based pay prevalent in western economies is generally
paid out as cash bonuses and perquisites.6. In our sample, variable averages about 28% of total
CEO pay.
We combine the information from Prowess with our hand-collected data to generate the year
of CEO resignation or retirement. We find 493 events of CEO turnover: 174 among the business
group affiliates and 319 among stand-alone firms. Alternatively, we can measure of incentive
alignment by the association between forced CEO turnover and firm performance. Because we do
not know the circumstances of a CEO’s departure, the classification of a forced or otherwise often
relies on age- or press-based algorithms (Homroy, 2014; Peters and Wagner, 2014). Following
Parrino (1997), we use a modified version of the most common algorithm in order to classify
forced turnover as developed by Parrino (1997). In the absence of reliable and consistent press
reports on CEO departures, we use CEO age at the time of departure to generate measures of
forced turnover. This is because press-based algorithms would dramatically reduce the sample
to include mostly the bigger and more visible firms, particularly for an emerging market sample.
Furthermore, the actual reasons for CEO departures are often cloaked in euphemisms, hence
6Equity ownership and option grants for CEOs are present in some firms but they form a very small proportion
of the total pay. We don’t use these in our calculation of CEO pay.
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such content-analysis exercise could be inaccurate.
CEO age data come from BoardEx and the median age of CEO turnover in our sample is
61.45 years. We construct an indicator for forced turnover that equals 1 if the departing CEO
is less than 60 years old.7 This gives us a sample of 244 events of forced CEO turnover: 163 in
business group firms and 81 in stand-alone firms.
Next, we use a range of controls for board and director characteristics. information on board
size, and number of independent directors come from Prowess. Following Clause-49 of SEBI, the
mean proportion of independent directors on the board is expected to be at least 0.5 for all firms.
In addition to the number of independent directors, we also control for the quality of directors.
Using information on individual directors’ education and experience from BoardEx, we identify
a directors as Technical Directors if they hold a technical qualification and/or have served on
specific board committees8 in other firms. We classify postgraduate degrees in Engineering,
Management, and doctoral degrees in STEM fields as technical qualifications. We check the
sensitivity of our classification by only restricting only to degrees awarded by the highest ranked
Indian and foreign universities and institutes. We encode the technical expertise of directors
if they have served on one or more of the following committees: nomination, remuneration,
or audit. We aggregate information on education and experience at the board level, and use a
measure of Technical Directors as a proportion of independent non-executive directors. In certain
specifications, we also control for the number of directors on the board from the controlling
stakeholder family, excluding the CEO.
We also use accounting information from stand-alone annual financial statements reported by
Prowess. We cross-check for the consistency by comparing it with information from Datastream
by using a string-matching algorithm on the basis of firm names.9 In our baseline specifications,
firm performance is measured by returns on assets (ROA), and we control for firm size by using
the natural log of sales10. Key variable descriptions are in appendix A1.
7We test for robustness of our classification by using fifty-five and fifty years as our age threshholds.
8Data on director expertise and education is available from the authors upon request.
9In cases where the data from the two sources do not match exactly, we use the financial data from Prowess.
10We also check the robustness of our estimates with alternate measures of firm performance (Tobin’s Q ap-
proximated by MTBV) and firm size (total assets).
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3.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 gives the summary statistics for corporate governance outcomes, firm characteristics, and
board characteristics for the sample firms. All monetary variables are scaled by Consumer Price
Indices published by the Government of India, and are in millions of US dollars. Sample firms
are large, with mean sales of $522 million. Average shareholding of the controlling shareholder
(family) is about 41%.11 We control for institutional shareholding by using the percentage of
equity shares held by financial institutions such as mutual funds, banks, insurance companies,
and venture capital funds (about 17% in the sample firms). Note that 37% of sample firms
have a CEO from the promoter family.12 The average board is comprised of 10 directors, 51%
of whom are independent non-executive directors. Average CEO pay is $ 4.3 million, and the
average CEO turnover rate is 14.5%.
[Table 1 around here]
The descriptive statistics in table 1 subsume heterogeneities across business group affiliates
and unaffiliated firms with dispersed shareholding. The first concern is that business group
affiliates and stand-alone firms operate in different industries with varying levels of competition.
Therefore, if business group firms are over-represented in industries of strategic importance (such
as coal, electricity generation and transportation, railways, or defense) this could explain how
they persist in emerging markets. However, as we noted earlier, in India, these industries are
almost exclusively served by public-sector firms.
Table 2 shows the industry distribution of business group affiliates and unaffiliated firms with
dispersed shareholding. Both types of firms appear to exist throughout all industry groups, and
therefore such industry classification does not seem to be the primary source of competitiveness.
All of our baseline specifications include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure
11A problem may arise if the controlling stakeholders reduce their holdings over time. In that case, over our
sample period we would expect to see more unaffiliated firms with dispersed holding at the expense of business
group affiliates. However, we find no evidence of that, and we observe that holdings of promoter family generally
remains stable over time. See the online appendix for the time-series variations of mean and median promoter
shareholdings in business-group affiliates.
12Stand-alones can have family CEOs who are either founders or are from the family of large in-
vestors/shareholders. About 8% have family CEOs, but they typically have very low personal holdings in the
firm.
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of industry competition, as well as industry dummies to control for other industry-level het-
erogeneities.13 In the next sub-section we present univariate comparisons of these two types of
firms on all observable characteristics.
[Table 2 near here]
3.3 Univariate analysis
The central focus of our empirical analysis is on how the shareholding structure of firms is corre-
lated with managerial incentives, firm strategy and firm performance. We conduct a univariate
analysis in which we compare firm- and board-level characteristics of business group affiliates
and stand-alone firms. The results in panels A and B of table 3 show the means and medians,
respectively. The significance of the mean (median) is based on a two-tailed t-test (Wilcoxon
test).
[Table 3 around here]
Business group affiliates on average are larger than stand-alone firms in terms of sales revenue
and total assets. Consistent with our definition, promoters have larger shareholdings in business
group affiliates, where CEOs have higher pay. However, no statistically significant difference
in performance emerges between the two categories of firm ownership, nor between board-level
characteristics or industry competition. Firms with different ownership structures differ on
measures of short-term strategic focus (Asset Turnover Ratio and Current Ratio), and on long-
term investments (R&D Expenditures and Capital Expenditures). Business group affiliates
and stand-alone firms differ in size and in measures of strategic initiatives, but there seems to
be no significant difference in firm performance measures.
Table 4 shows that business group affiliates with family-CEOs have higher stakeholding by
promoters, and higher CEO pay, as well as a lower rate of CEO turnovers and fewer directors
from the promoter family. This may suggest that within business groups, two kinds of firms
exist: 1) firms with a family CEO, higher family stakeholding, and fewer family members on the
13In the online appendix, we present the distribution of business group affiliates and unaffiliated firms with
dispersed shareholding by quarties of industry competitiveness, as measured by the HHI. Both types of firms
seem to be present in all quartiles of competitveness.
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board; 2) those with an outside CEO where controlling stakeholders have relatively more board
seats.
In the following sections, we use multivariate analyses to investigate differences among
incentive-alignment mechanisms, firm strategy and firm performance under different ownership
structures.
[Table 4 around here]
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
This section describes our methods and the results of our empirical analysis. First, we examine
the central question of the paper: How do managerial incentive alignment mechanisms vary
with ownership structures? We also examine whether these mechanisms affects strategic choices.
Finally, we assess how the financial performance of firms varies with ownership structure.
4.1 Ownership structure and managerial incentives
The univariate results suggest that significant differences in firm and managerial incentives exist
between business group affiliates and stand-alone firms. To investigate managerial incentive
alignment mechanisms, we specifically examine the performance sensitivities of CEO pay and
CEO turnover, controlling for firm and board characteristics. This approach, consistent with
Bryson et al. (2014) and Gibson (2003), is used to examine the incentive alignment and effective-
ness of governance mechanisms. The performance sensitivities of CEO pay and CEO turnover
in themselves are not sufficient to infer the degree to which incentive-alignment is effective.
However, they form the necessary conditions for effective corporate governance and can thus be
used as a reliable basis of comparison.
We first explore the managerial incentive alignment mechanisms for business group affili-
ates and unaffiliated firms with dispersed shareholding. To do this, we examine differences in
incentive alignment for business group affiliates with and without family CEOs. One way to
compare the incentives of business group affiliates with and without a family CEO is to identify
events where a family CEO is replaced by an outside CEO, or vice-versa. Changes in CEO
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pay around such events can shed light on the differences in incentive-alignment mechanisms. In
our sample such events are rare, and anecdotal evidence suggests that each of these events has
some distinctive features. For example, Ratan Tata, the patriarch of the Tata Group, retired in
2012. Ratan Tata had never married and had no children. His successor was a non-Tata family
member, Cyrus Mistry, a member of the Palonji family of Shapoorji Palonji and Company, who
hold 9.5% of Tata Group stocks. A pay comparison around this change would not be very
representative considering the relatively large stakeholding of the new outside CEO.Given the
small number of such events and their special circumstances, we focus on a pooled cross-section
of firms of both types in our empirical analyses.
To examine the performance sensitivity of CEO pay, we estimate the baseline specification:
CEOPay = f(α1ROA+ α2Bu sin ess Group
Affiliates+ α3FamilyCEO + γZit) (1)
where firm performance is measured by return on assets (ROA), α1 captures the effect of
firm performance on CEO pay and Zit is a vector of all control variables. This is a pooled cross-
section regression without firm-fixed effects, because we are interested in the cross-sectional
variations across the two types of ownership structures.
The key variable is Business Group Affiliates. Where α2 is positive and statistically signifi-
cant, it indicates that CEOs of business group affiliates are paid more than CEOs of stand-alone
firms. Similarly if α3 is positive, pay would be higher for CEOs who are members of a control-
ling family. To better examine the incentive alignment mechanism, we divide the business group
firms into two subgroups: those with a family-CEO and those with an outside CEO. We run a
version of specification (1) for these two subgroups and for stand-alone firms separately. The
results are in table 5.
Column (1) reports the estimates from Equation (1). We present the results for the sub-
samples of business group affiliates and stand-alone firms in columns (2)-(5). All estimates are
reported with robust standard errors, clustered at firm level. Note that the coefficient on ROA
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is positive implying that CEO pay is generally sensitive to firm performance across both types
of ownership structure. From column (1), the Business Group Affiliates indicator is positive
and statistically significant, suggesting that CEOs of business group affiliates are paid more
than their counterparts in stand-alone firms. Similarly, family CEOs are paid more than outside
CEOs. However, the coefficients in columns (2)-(5) are not directly comparable, and do not
provide an objective comparison of performance sensitivity of CEO pay across the two types of
firms.
To provide a fuller comparison, in column (6) we add the interactions of ROA∗Business
Groups with Family CEOs and ROA∗Business Groups with Outside CEOs. We also use the
interactions of all covariates with Business Groups with Family CEOs and Business Groups with
Outside CEOs dummies. We also use the interactions of all covariates with Business Groups
with Family CEOs and Business Groups with Outside CEOs with all covariates as regressors.
This provides a nested model that allows objective comparison of the parameter estimates of
ROA∗Business Groups with Family CEOs and ROA∗Business Groups with Outside CEOs with
respect to the reference group of CEOs in stand-alone firms.
[Table 5 around here]
The parameter estimate of ROA∗Business Groups with Family CEOs is positive and sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level while that of ROA∗Business Groups with Outside CEOs is
positive but not statistically significant at conventional levels. To quantify, one standard devia-
tion increase in ROA leads to a 0.24 standard deviation increase in CEO pay in business group
affiliates with family CEOs, a 0.15 standard deviation increase in business group with outside
CEOs, and a 0.11 standard deviation increase in CEO pay of stand-alone firms.
The results suggest that business group affiliates with family CEOs have a higher pay-
performance sensitivity (a carrot-type incentive), but no significant difference in CEO pay-
performance sensitivity exists for group affiliates with an outside CEO and stand-alone firms.
We observe this higher pay-performance sensitivity after controlling for the incentive alignment
generated by the shareholding of the promoters. This is consistent with the hypothesis that,
when stick-type incentives are not credible, carrot-type incentives dominate.14
14The results are robust to alternate measures of firm performance. Note tjat the sensitivity is stronger for
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Next, we examine the performance sensitivity of CEO turnovers by estimating the following
specification with a binary indicator of CEO turnover as the dependent variable:
Probability(ForcedTurnover) = f(β1FirmPerformance+ β2Bu sin ess
GroupAffiliates+ β3FamilyCEO + θZit) (2)
We measure firm performance by ROA, Zit is a vector of other control variables and f(.) is a
logit function. We follow a similar method of enquiry as equation (1) to examine whether poorer-
performing CEOs of business group affiliates, and family CEOs are equally likely to be replaced
with respect to outside CEOs in group affiliates. We also test this specification on a subsample
of business group affiliates with family CEOs, business group firms with outside CEOs, and
stand-alone firms. The results are presented in Table 6. Column (1) reports the estimates from
Equation (2). We present the results for the subsamples of business group affiliates and stand-
alone firms in columns (2)–(5). All estimates are reported with robust standard errors clustered
at the firm level.
The coefficient of ROA is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that CEOs are
typically replaced for poor performance. But the coefficient on the Business Group indicator
is negative. Therefor, CEOs of business group affiliates and family CEOs are less likely to be
replaced for poor performance. Similarly to Table 5, we estimate the performance sensitivity
of forced CEO turnover in column (6) by adding the interactions of ROA∗Business Groups
with Family CEOs and ROA∗ Business Groups with Outside CEOs. In addition, we use the
interactions of all covariates with Business Groups with Family CEOs and Business Groups
with Outside CEOs. dummies. This allows us to compare the performance sensitivity of CEO
turnover for group affiliates with and without a family CEO, with respect to the base group of
stand-alone firms within a nested specification.
[Table 6 around here]
accounting performance relative to that for MTBV. This is perhaps driven by the fact that the pay for Indian
CEOs is structured so that the performance-based bonus is contingent on the accounting performance of the firm.
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The parameter estimate of ROA∗Business Groups with Family CEOs is negative but not sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels. For family CEOs in business group affiliates, there is
no significant association between the likelihood of turnover and firm performance. The perfor-
mance sensitivity of CEO turnovers in business group firms with an outside CEO seems similar
to that of stand-alone firms. This is consistent with the notion of stick-type incentives dominat-
ing carrot-type incentives. The coefficient of ROA in column 3 is not statistically different from
zero: We conclude that, for promoter CEOs in business group firms, stick-type incentives are
not effective. The presented results are the marginal effects from the logit regressions. Follow-
ing Powers (2005) and Buis (2010), we calculate the marginal effects at the mean, taking into
account the potential bias in interaction terms in logit regressions.15 To quantify, the likelihood
of forced turnover for an average CEO of a business group affiliate is 2 percentage points lower
than that for an average CEO in a widely held firm. The likelihood of forced turnover for family
CEOs in poorly performing business group firms is also lower than that for an outside CEO in a
poorly performing business group firm. The nested logit results are conistent with the estimates
from the nested linear probability model in column (7).
Together, these results provide new evidence on incentive alignment mechanisms in firms
with differing shareholding structures. Given the costs associated with administering a complete
contract, the incentive alignment mechanisms vary so that in a way that either the stick-type
or the carrot-type dominates in firms with different ownership structures.
4.2 Ownership structure, firm strategy, and firm performance
In this section, we examine the effect of ownership structure, and managerial incentives on the
strategic choices of firms. As we showed above, carrot-type incentives dominate for CEOs in
business group firms, and stick-type incentives dominate for CEOs in widely held firms. We
examine whether these incentives are associated with the strategic choices of the CEO. For
example, a professional CEO with a stick-type incentive may be more inclined to emphasize
short-term objectives. On the other hand, a family CEO, for whom carrot-type incentives
15Recent versions of certain statistical packages such as Stata 15 can calculate marginal effects separately for
each category in a binary or factor variable. For a detailed discussion on the marginal effects of interaction terms
in non-linear models, see Buis (2010) and Williams (2012).
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dominate, is likely to prioritize long-term strategies. We examine whether there is any differences
in priorities based on two long-term strategic measures (capital expenditure and research and
development expenditure) and two short-term measures (asset-turnover and current ratios). We
choose these measures as a proxy for the time-horizon of the strategic focus. Note that high
current ratio might mean that a firm’s short-term financial position is relatively secure, but it
may also suggest that the firm is not using its liquid assets effectively. Either way, we can argue
that that higher current ratio has short-term benefits. Similarly, other things equal, higher
asset turnover ratio indicates more efficient use of the assets in place but a CEO with short
term incentives may be tempted to improve this ratio by cutting down capital expenditure on
profitable long term investment opportunities. On the other hand, the returns to long-term
investments like research and development expenses accrue over a longer time horizon. Hence
we interpret it as a measure of long-term strategic focus.
Table 7 presents our results. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are short-term
strategy measures: the asset-turnover-ratio and the current ratio respectively. The dependent
variables in columns (3) and (4) are the long-term measures: R&D and Capital Expenditures.
The main regressor is the Business Group Affiliates indicator, which captures the difference in
strategy between business group affiliates and stand-alone entities. In columns (1) and (2), this
indicator is negative and significant for measures reflecting short-term strategies. However, it is
positive and significant for the long-term measures (columns (3) and (4)). Moreover, business
group affiliates with family CEOs are likely to prefer longer-term investment over short-term
strategies, as is seen from the coefficient of the interaction term,Family CEO*BusinessGroup
Affiliates. It is positive and significant for long-term strategic measures, but not statistically
significant for short-term measures. These results are consistent with Siegel and Choudhury’s
(2012) argument that group affiliates and stand-alone firms have different strategic priorities,
and thus have different incentive alignment mechanisms.
[Table 7 around here]
However, in spite of the differences in strategic choices and incentive alignment mechanisms, a
firm’s objective is difficult to examine except through the lens of shareholder value maximization.
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Therefore, we consider whether these differences lead to differences in performance of business
group affiliates with respect to stand-alone firms. We estimate the specification:
FirmPerformace = f(δBu sin ess Group Affiliates+ λXit) (3)
where Business Group Affiliates is an indicator of shareholding structure, and Xit is a vector
of all firm and board-level observable variables. We use a range of firm performance measures
such as ROA, Tobin’s Q (approximated by MTBV ), and Earnings per share (EPS). The
results are presented in Table 8.
[Table 8 around here]
Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 8 give the results for the full sample withthe three measures
of firm performance, ROA, MTBV and EPS, respectively, and the indicator for business group
affiliates as our main regressor.16 If the performance of business group firms differs from that
of firms with dispersed holding structure, we would expect a statistically significant coefficient
on the indicator for business group. However, this indicator is not statistically significant at
conventional levels in any of the columns. Also, no difference in performance exists between
business group affiliates with family CEOs, and those with outside CEOs. These results suggest
no significant difference in performance for business group affiliates with concentrated sharehold-
ing and widely held standalones. This is consistent with Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985) argument
that the ownership structure of firms evolves in ways that are consistent with the proposition of
value maximization.
4.3 Robustness
To test for the robustness of our baseline results we use a series of sample selection techniques
and tests. Variable pay constitutes about one-third of Indian CEO pay contracts, which are
largely in the form of a performance-based bonus. So, to test the robustness of our baseline
estimates on pay-performance sensitivity we use the fraction of variable pay/total pay as the
16We test for the robustness of our results by using raw and industry-adjusted returns on the firms’ stocks over
one-year and three-year periods. The results are qualitatively similar and are in the online appendix.
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dependent variable. Family CEOs in group affiliates have a higher percentage of variable pay
and higher performance sensitivity of variable pay than outside CEOs in group affiliates, and
CEOs of stand-alone firms. The results are in panel A of Table 9.17
Next, we increase the sample of CEO turnovers by including all resignation events in our
classification. This yields a sample of 493 events. Using this sample, we find that the sensitivity
of CEO turnover to performance is comparable to our baseline estimates: CEO turnover in group
affiliates with a family CEO is not sensitive to firm performance, but performance sensitivity of
CEO turnover is comparable in group affiliates with outside CEOs and stand-alone firms. The
results are in panel B of Table 9.
[Table 9 around here]
Note that one concern could be that business group affiliates are on average larger than
unaffiliated firms. Thus the reported pay-performance sensitivity could reflect non-linear size
effects. In our baseline specifications, we use the natural log of sales as a measure of firm
size, which allows us to correct for any non-linearity induced by extreme values. In a different
specification, reported in the online appendix, we use sales and sales-squared as measures of
firm size. The coefficient on sales is positive and statistically significant but the coefficient on
sales-squared is negative and not significant at conventional levels.
We also test for non-linearities in the performance sensitivity of CEO pay and CEO turnover
by using different quartiles of firm performance. The results are similar to our baseline estimates.
CEO turnover is more likely for stand-alone firms in the upper quartile of performance. This is
consistent with the results of Gregory-Smith et al. (2009) and Homroy (2014), who attribute it
to the higher likelihood of CEOs voluntarily resigning for better opportunities. In comparison,
CEOs of business group affiliates are less likely to be motivated by the threat of dismissal or by
the prospect of better opportunities.
Next, we use industry-adjusted firm performance to control for industry-specific heterogene-
ity at both two-digit and finer-grain three-digit standard industrial classification code levels.
Firm ROA is benchmarked with the median ROA of the same two-digit industry group for that
17In unreported results we use the natural log of variable pay as the measure of CEO pay. The coefficient
estimate of ROA is qualitatively similar to our baseline estimates.
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year. We estimate the specifications in Tables 3 and 4 using industry-adjusted ROA. Industry
adjusted ROA is more strongly associated with CEO turnover than industry-adjusted MTBV .
This is not surprising given that stock market performance in emerging economies is a noisier
signal of performance than in the developed economies (Demigu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine, 1995). The
results are qualitatively similar and can be found in the online appendix.
We also investigate whether controlling shareholders extract their returns through sale of
shares or receipt of dividends. In either case, their incentives will be closely aligned with that
of minority shareholders, and will make them less prone to tunnel resources. To that end, we
examine the time series variations in the shareholding of promoters, and the dividends paid. The
proportion of shares held by promoters tends to be stable over time, and we find that promoters
do not divest their stake significantly over time. We examine cases where the percentage of
promoters’ shareholdings has decreased over the sample period. In all cases (about 7% of the
business group affiliates), a decrease is associated with the issuance of new equity. Therefore
these reductions appear to be financing decisions rather than control decisions. We discuss this
in details in the online appendix. Similarly, we find no statistically significant difference in the
dividends paid by group affiliates or stand-alone firms.
In unreported tests, we conduct a further set of robustness checks. First, we use firm fixed
effects regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to check the validity of
our baseline results. In order to do this, we exclude all time invariant firm level dummies from
our models.Business Group Affiliates and Family CEO indicators) are not required in these
specification but we keep the relevant interaction terms . We find that key associations persist:
Carrot- type incentives dominate in business group affiliates with family CEOs and it have more
weight in firms with higher %Shareholding−Promoters, and stick type incentives dominates in
other group. Moreover, business group affiliates and higher shareholding concentration is asso-
ciated with higher long-term investments, but their association with firm performance measures
are not statistically significant. Most of the firms in the banking and financial services industry
are in the public sector and have been excluded in the initial sampling. We further exclude any
remaining firms with significant interests in the financial services industry. The results with the
reduced sample are qualitatively similar but less precise than our baseline estimates.
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Second, we use a matched sample of business group affiliates and unaffiliated firms with dis-
persed shareholding to test our baseline results.18 We match firms on the following observables:
sales, board characteristics, institutional holdings, and HHI. Our results are qualitatively similar
to the baseline estimates of incentive alignment, strategic objectives, and firm performance.
Third, we test the robustness of our tests for the performance of firms with different ownership
structures using industry-adjusted-ROA. We find no significant differences in returns for business
group affiliates and unaffiliated firms. Finally, we conduct robustness tests after winsorizing the
full sample at 1%, and 5% levels. The results with the 5% levels are less precise due to smaller
sample-size, but are qualitatively similar to our baseline estimates.
5 Conclusion
Conventional wisdom in corporate finance states that business groups tend to be poorly governed,
act as expropriation devices for controlling stakeholders, and are subpar performers compared
to widely held firms. However, these views do not take into account the differing strategic objec-
tives of firms with different ownership structures. We find that managerial incentive alignment
mechanisms differ systematically across business group affiliates and in stand-alone firms. Busi-
ness group affiliates with family CEOs have stronger pay-performance sensitivity (carrot-type
incentive) but CEO turnover–firm performance sensitivity (stick-type incentive) dominates in
stand-alone firms. Furthermore, in business group affiliates with outside CEOs, stick-type incen-
tives dominate. Firms with different ownership structures face different agency and transaction
costs, so the incentive alignment mechanisms are likely to differ as well. Our results are not
consistent with the notion of weak governance in business group affiliates.
The differences in managerial incentive structure are reflected in firms’ strategic choices.
Faced with a stick-type incentive, CEOs of stand-alone firms choose shorter-term strategic ob-
jectives, while CEOs of business group affiliates with intergenerational stakeholding in the firm
tend to invest in longer-term projects. Notwithstanding the differences in managerial incentive
alignment and strategic objectives, we find no significant difference in firm performance between
the two types of firms.
18We use a k:1 radius matching with radius=0.2, and check the sensitivity of our results to radius=0.1 and 0.3.
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It is important to note that our results shed no light on the welfare implications of business
group affiliation compared to widely held firms. They simply show that different firm ownership
structures impose different constraints on the firm and,consequently, firms tend to use different
resource allocation strategies. The welfare implications of business group affiliates depend on
a range of factors such as their ability to use political connections, the role of other outside
shareholders including institutional holding, and their towards social and environmental strate-
gies. It is entirely plausible that controlling shareholders expropriate at the expense of minority
shareholders in Indian business groups. Our results show that, even in that scenario, group
affiliates are not generally less profitable than widely held firms.
27
References
[1] Anderson, R., Reeb, D., 2003. Founding family ownership and firm performance: Evidence
from the S&P 500. J. Financ. 58, 1301– 1328.
[2] Armstrong, C.S., Vasistha, R., 2012. Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incen-
tives, and firm value . J.Financ.Econ. 104(1), 70-88.
[3] Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., Mullainathan, S., 2002. Ferreting out tunneling: An application
to Indian business groups. Q. J. Econ. 117 (1), 121–147.
[4] Berglof, E., Perotti, E., 1994. The governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu.
J. Financ. Econ. 36, 259–284.
[5] Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S., 2001. Are CEOs paid for luck? The ones without principles
are. Q. J. Econ. 116 (3), 901–952.
[6] Black, B. S., Jang, H., Kim, W., 2006. Predicting firms’ corporate governance choices:
Evidence from Korea. J. Corp. Financ. 12, 660–691.
[7] Bryson, A., Forth, J., Zhou, M., 2014. Same or different? The CEO labour market in
China’s publicly listed companies. Econ. J. 124 (574), 90–108.
[8] Buis, M.L., 2010. Interpretations of interactions in nonlinear models, Stata Journal. 10,
305-308.
[9] Chakrabarti, R., Yadav, P.K., Megginson, W.L., 2007. Corporate governance in India. J.
Appl. Corp. Financ. 20, 59-72.
[10] Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., Lang, L. H. P., 2002. Disentangling the incentive
and entrenchment effects of large shareholding. J. Financ. 57, 2741–2771.
[11] Conyon, M.J., Core, J., Guay, W.R., 2011. Are US CEOs Paid More Than UK CEOs?
Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay. Rev. Financ. Stud. vol. 24 (2), 402-408.
[12] Conyon, M.J., He, L., 2011. Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China,
J. Corp. Financ. 17, 1158-75.
28
[13] Croci, E., Gonenc, H., Ozkan, N., 2012. CEO compensation, family control, and institu-
tional investors in Continental Europe. J. Banking and Financ. 36(12), 3318-3335.
[14] Croci, E., and Petmezas, D., 2015. Do risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to invest? New
evidence from acquisitions. J. Corp. Financ. 32, 1-23.
[15] Cronqvist, H., Nilsson, M., 2003. Agency costs and controlling minority shareholders. J.
Financ. and Quant. Anal. 38, 695–719.
[16] Demigu¨c¸-Kunt, A., Levine, R., 1995. Stock market development and financial intermedi-
aries: Stylized facts. World Bank Econ. Rev. 10, 291–321.
[17] Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and conse-
quences. J. Polit. Econ. 93 (6), 1155–1177.
[18] Dittman, I., Maug, E., Spalt, O., 2010. Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation
when Managers are Loss Averse, J. Financ. 65(6), 2015-2050.
[19] Ederer, F., Manso, G., 2016. Is pay for performance detrimental to innovation? Man Sci.
59(7), 1496-1513.
[20] Gabaix, X., Landier, A., 2008. Why has CEO pay increased so much? Q. J. Econ. 121 (1),
49–100.
[21] Gibson, M. S., 2003. Is corporate governance ineffective in emerging markets? J. Financ.
and Quant. Anal. 38 (1), 231–250.
[22] Gopalan, R., Nanda, V., Seru, A., 2007. Affiliated firms and financial support: Evidence
from Indian business groups. J. Financ. Econ. 86, 759-795.
[23] Gregory-Smith, I., Thompson, S., Wright, P.W., 2009. Fired or retired? A competing risks
analysis of chief executive turnover. Econ. J. 119, 463–481.
[24] Holderness, C.G., 2009. The myth of diffuse ownership in the United States, Rev. Financ.
Stud. 22, 1377-1408.
29
[25] Holderness, C. G., Sheehan, D.P., 1988. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held
corporations. J. Financ. Econ. 20, 317–346.
[26] Homroy, S., 2014. Was Adam Smith Right? Evidence of Compensating Differential in CEO
Pay, Man Sch. 84(1), 1-24.
[27] Jameson, M., Prevost, A., Puthenpurackal, J., 2014. Controlling shareholders, board struc-
ture, and firm performance: evidence from India. J. Corp. Financ. 27, 1–20.
[28] Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, P., Friedman, E., 2000. Corporate governance in the Asian
financial crisis. J. Financ. Econ., 58, 141–186.
[29] Kang, J. K., Shivdasani, A., 1995. Firm performance, corporate governance, and top exec-
utive turnover in Japan. J. Financ. Econ., 38, 29–58.
[30] Kaplan, S. N., 1994. Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of Japan
and the United States. J. Polit. Econ. 102, 510–546.
[31] Kaplan, S. N., 1997. Corporate governance and corporate performance: A comparison of
Germany, Japan, and the US, in: D. H. Chew (Ed.), Studies in International Corporate
Finance and Governance Systems, Oxford University Press, New York.
[32] Kaplan, S. N., Minton, B.A., 2012. How has CEO turnover changed? Int. Rev. Financ. 12
(1), 57–87.
[33] Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 2000. Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An
analysis of diversified Indian business groups. J. Financ. 55 (2), 867–891.
[34] Khanna, T., Yafeh, Y., 2007. Business groups in emerging markets: Paragons or parasites?
J. Econ. Lit. 45 (2), 331–372.
[35] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the
world. J. Financ. 54, 471–517.
[36] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. Law and finance. J.
Polit. Econ. 106, 1113–1155.
30
[37] Low, A., 2009. Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation. J. Financ.
Econ. 92, 470-490.
[38] Manso, G., 2011. Motivating Innovation. J. Financ. 66, 1823-1869.
[39] Masulis, R.W., Pham, P.K., Zein, J., 2011. Family business groups around the world:
Financing advantages, control motivations, and organization choices. Rev. Financ. Stud.
24, 3556-3600.
[40] Masulis, R.W., Wang, C., Xie, F., 2009. Agency problems at dual-class companies. J.
Financ. 64, 1697-1727.
[41] Maury, B., 2006. Family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from Western European
corporations. J. Corp. Financ. 12, 321–341.
[42] Parrino, R., 1997. CEO turnover and outside succession: A cross-sectional analysis. J. Fi-
nanc. Econ. 46, 165-197.
[43] Patibandla, M., 2006. Equity pattern, corporate governance, and performance: A study of
India’s corporate sector. J. Econ. Behav. and Organ. 59, 29–44
[44] Peters, F.S., Wagner,.A.F., 2014. The executive turnover risk premium. J. Financ., 69(4),
1529-1563.
[45] Powers, E., 2005. Interpreting logit regressions with interaction terms: An application to
the management turnover literature, J. Corp. Financ. 11, 504-522.
[46] Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. J. Financ. 52, 461–492.
[47] Siegel, J., Choudhury, P., 2012. A reexamination of tunneling and business groups: New
data and new methods. Rev. Financ. Stud., 25, 1763–1798.
[48] Williams, R., 2012. Using the margins command to estimate and interpret adjusted predic-
tions and marginal effects, Stata Journal 12, 308-331.




Summary statistics. This table provides summary statistics for all the variables in our full
sample. The sample is based on 4,143 observations of Indian firms for which financial and
board data are available. Variables as described in appendix A.
N Mean Median Std. Dev. 10pct 90pct
Panel A: Equity ownership variables
%Shareholding-Promoters 4,143 41.577 30.231 20.847 0.000 88.910
%Shareholding-Institutions 4,143 17.806 17.502 14.496 0.000 88.191
Family CEO 4,143 0.374 0.288 0.484 0.000 1.000
Panel B: Managerial incentives and strategic choices variables
CEO Pay (/1,000,000) 4,143 4.635 3.145 8.988 0.272 17.000
Forced CEO Turnover 4,143 0.145 0.154 0.352 0.000 1.000
Asset Turnover Ratio 4,143 0.560 0.533 0.597 0.000 1.873
Current Ratio 4,143 2.320 2.155 0.960 0.044 3.372
R&D Expenditures 2,625 0.047 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.608
Capital Expenditures 2,337 0.069 0.001 0.077 0.000 0.636
Panel C: Board variables
Board Size 4,143 9.948 7.449 3.327 4.000 33.000
% Independent Directors 4,143 51.797 50.003 16.181 48.331 93.500
% Technical Directors 4,143 0.700 0.600 0.466 0.000 4.000
Panel D: Financial variables
Sales (/1,000,000) 4,143 522.592 438.430 2229.181 0.011 68215.141
Total Assets (/1,000,000) 4,143 77.120 89.122 264.820 .210 6332.590
ROA 4,143 0.083 0.064 0.111 -0.847 1.826
MTBV 4,143 1.419 0.988 2.917 0.187 13.521
EPS 4,143 0.547 0.523 8.373 -5.741 550.340
HHI 4,143 0.690 0.671 0.102 0.025 0.768
Dividend Payout 4,143 0.019 0.012 0.016 0.000 0.102
32
Table 2
Industry distribution of different ownership structures.
This table illustrates the distribution of firms with different
ownership structures across the main industry classifications.
We find that both types of firms are present in all industry class
-ifications, but with varying proportions.
Industry Business Group Stand-Alone
Affiliates Firms
Agricultural Products 18 21
Automobiles and Transport 15 21
Chemicals and Fertilizers 18 15
Food and Beverages 14 31
Industrials 21 19
Infrastructure 12 24
Jewellery, Gemstones and 10 29
Precious Metals
Leather and Footwear 14 33
Metals and Metallurgy 23 13
Minerals and Petroleum 13 10
Paper 09 25
Pharmaceuticals 11 12
Plastic Products 11 17
Services 11 28
Sustainable Energy 08 11
Textiles and Garments 18 42














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Business group affiliation and firm strategy. This table illustrates the strategic choices of business gro-
up affiliates and stand-alone firms. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variables reflect shorter
term measures, the dependent variables in columns (3) and (4) reflect longer term strategic choices.
Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable
Short term strategic measures Long term strategic measures
Asset Turnover Current Ratio R&D Capital
Ratio Expenditures Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Business Group Affiliates -0.134*** -0.151** 0.213*** 0.118**
(0.017) (0.044) (0.081) (0.063)
ROA 1.198*** 0.906*** 1.832*** 0.939**
(0.059) (0.063) (0.118) (0.137)
Ln(Sales) 0.257 0.141 0.427 0.202
(0.332) (0.144) (0.629) (0.181)
Family-CEO -0.012 0.005 0.014** 0.027**
(0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013)
Family CEO* -0.018 -0.006 0.005** 0.009**
BusinessGroup (0.011) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
% Shareholding- -0.001 0.007 0.013 0.009
Promoters (0.001) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
% Shareholding- -0.063** -0.042*** 0.069* 0.033*
Institutions (0.026) (0.015) (0.041) (0.017)
Board Size 0.204* 0.089 0.294 0.211
(0.111) (0.056) (0.183) (0.169)
% Independent Directors 0.020 0.026*** 0.021 0.0135
(0.018) (0.010) (0.029) (0.009)
%Technical Directors 0.037 -0.018 0.726*** 0.031
(0.046) (0.020) (0.145) (0.025)
Export / Sales (%) -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 4,143 4,143 2,625 2,337
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.128 0.077 0.093
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Table 8
Business group affiliation and firm performance. This table illustrates
the performance effects of business group affiliation. The dependent
variables in columns 1, 2, and 3 are ROA, MTBV , and EPS, respect-
ively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level are in the




Business Group -0.005 12.85 -0.201
Affiliates (0.004) (9.40) (0.233)
Ln(Sales) 0.008*** -9.580*** 0.118**
(0.001) (2.956) (0.038)
Family-CEO -0.018*** -20.051** -0.267
(0.003) (9.062) (0.238)
BusinessGroupAffiliates 0.000 2.284 -0.009
*Family CEO (0.000) (1.414) (0.009)
% Shareholding- 0.000 1.695* 0.006
Institutions (0.000) (0.874) (0.004)
Board Size 0.000 -2.408* 0.036
(0.000) (1.455) (0.028)
% Independent Directors 0.000 0.076 0.016
(0.000) (0.318) (0.009)
% Technical Directors 0.013 0.004 -0.028
(0.008) (0.011) (0.017)
Export / Sales (%) 0.014 0.013 0.009
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,143 4,143 4,143
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.149 0.107
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